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THE BROAD SWEEP OF AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY:
A THREAT TO TRADEMARK PROTECTION OF
AESTHETIC PRODUCT FEATURES
INTRODUCTION
The aesthetic appeal of a product has become increasingly impor-
tant to its marketing potential' by aiding in the differentiation and
identification of the product.2 Consequently, obtaining trademark
protection 3 for the aesthetic components of a product is quite benefi-
1. See Spratling, The Protectability of Package, Container, and Product Con-
figurations [Part I], 5 U.S.F.L. Rev. 451, 456, 462-63 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Spratling I].
2. See id. at 462-63.
3. Trademark protection in an identifying symbol may be acquired under fed-
eral or state law. At the federal level, the Lanham Act grants protection to marks
registered on its Principal Register, Lanham Act, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976),
provided they have been adopted and used as an indication of source. Id. The Act
also provides protection for unregistered common-law trademarks under its unfair
competition section. Lanham Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976); 1 J. Gilson,
Trademark Protection and Practice § 7.02 [1], at 7-10 (1982); see International Order
of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981). At the state level, the common law of unfair competi-
tion and state trademark laws also may apply to prevent trademark infringement. Id.
at 916; 1 J. Gilson, supra, § 1.04, at 1-38.3.
Trademark law is but a species of unfair competition law. E.g., International
Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competi-
tion § 2:2, at 44 (1973). The early common law distinguished between "technical"
trademarks, which were inherently distinctive identifying symbols protected under a
body of law known as trademark infringement, and marks that were not inherently
distinctive and protected only under unfair competition law upon a showing of
secondary meaning. Id. § 4:3, at 98-100. Today, however, this distinction is consid-
ered insignificant. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1946 U.S.
Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 1275.
While the entire field of unfair competition law encompasses other unfair trade
practices, such as trade dress simulation, 1 J. McCarthy, supra, § 1:5, at 14; see 1 J.
Gilson, supra, § 7.02[2], at 7-19, a common-law action for unfair competition as to
the confusingly similar use of an identifying symbol or mark is equivalent to an action
for common-law trademark infringement. Id. § 1.04[1], at 1-40 n.10; see Capewell
Horse Nail Co. v. Mooney, 172 F. 826, 827 (2d Cir. 1909); 1 J. McCarthy, supra, §
2:3, at 46; id. § 4:4, at 104. Such common-law actions typically involve marks
adopted and used as indicia of origin that are not registered under the Lanham Act.
See Damn I'm Good Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). When a mark has been registered under the Act, the cause of action is one for
trademark infringement. Lanham Act, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976). In a typical
suit, however, a plaintiff may assert different counts based on the Lanham Act,
common-law trademark infringement and unfair competition. See National Foot-
ball League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 654
(W.D. Wash. 1982).
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cial for a manufacturer. In recent years, certain courts have denied
exclusive trademark rights4 in aesthetic features5 because they have
deemed those features functional. 6
The doctrine of functionality provides that "functional" product
features7 not otherwise protected by a utility patents are in the public
domain and may be freely copied 9 despite the existence of a secondary
4. The primary focus of this Note is the doctrine of functionality as it relates to
trademark protection. For an extensive discussion of the functionality doctrine with
respect to the law of unfair competition, see Unfair Competition and the Doctrine of
Functionality, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 544 (1964)[hereinafter cited as Doctrine of Func-
tionality].
5. For purposes of this Note, aesthetic features include: color, see Ventura
Travelware, Inc. v. Baltimore Luggage Co., 66 Misc. 2d 646, 647, 322 N.Y.S.2d 93,
96 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (striped color pattern on luggage), aff'd, 38 A.D.2d 794, 328
N.Y.S.2d 811 (1972), overall shape, see In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d
925, 926-27 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (overall configuration of a wine decanter), aff'd, 372
F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967), the shape of a component part, see Famolare, Inc. v.
Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 740 (D. Hawaii 1979) (design of soles of shoes),
aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981), or an imprinted design pattern. See Pagliero
v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 340 (9th Cir. 1952) (floral pattern imprinted on
china). Aesthetic features constitute a subcategory of product features. For an enu-
meration of types of product features, see infra note 7.
6. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912,
920 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Bliss v. Gotham Indus., 316
F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1963); Damn I'm Good Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp.
1357, 1362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738,
744 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981); PPS, Inc. v. Jewelry
Sales Representatives, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ventura
Travelware, Inc. v. Baltimore Luggage Co., 66 Misc. 2d 646, 650-51, 322 N.Y.S.2d
93, 100 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 A.D.2d 794, 328 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1972).
7. For purposes of this Note, product features analyzed under the doctrine of
functionality include a design pattern inscribed or imprinted on the product, see
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 340, 343 (9th Cir. 1952), the product's
overall shape, see In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 498 (C.C.P.A.
1961), and the shape of parts of the product. See Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Watson,
150 F. Supp. 861, 862 (D.D.C. 1957). For purposes of this Note, the features of a
product's container are treated as "product features." See Champion Spark Plug Co.
v. A.R. Mosler & Co., 233 F. 112, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)("Nor does it matter ...
whether the feature lies in the case or container or inthe very thing itself."); Duo-
Tint Bulb & Battery Co. v. Moline Supply Co., 46 Ill. App. 3d 145, 153, 360 N.E.2d
798, 804 (1977)("[T]he doctrine of functionality applies equally to the package as to
its contents.").
8. The only exclusive rights afforded to functional product features are those
that may exist under the utility patent laws. 1 J. Gilson, supra note 3, § 2.13, at 2-
101; 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:26, at 195; see Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock
Co., 413 F.2d 1195, 1199 (C.C.P.A. 1969). A utility patent is a grant of "the right to
exclude others from making, using or selling" a novel and non-obvious useful inven-
tion, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (1976), for a seventeen year period. 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1976).
9. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981); In re
Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336-37 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Deister
Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961); Duo-Tint Bulb & Battery Co.
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meaning,' 0 which is a consumer recognition of the feature as an
indication of the product's source." The basis of the doctrine is the
strong public policy of promoting free competition;12 courts have
given great deference to the notion that no one should be awarded
exclusive rights in useful product features.' 3
A feature is deemed functional if it is primarily dictated by utilitar-
ian considerations; that is, it provides a significant contribution to the
use or efficiency of a product. 14 Although this standard has been
applied consistently to mechanical elements of a product's construc-
tion,15 functionality analyses, in the past, did not address aesthetic
product features.' 6 A growing number of courts, however, have re-
cently analyzed aesthetic features under a broad functionality stan-
v. Moline Supply Co., 46 Ill. App. 3d 145, 151, 360 N.E.2d 798, 802-03 (1977);
Spratling I, supra note 1, at 480-82.
10. Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 744-45 (D. Hawaii
1979), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio
Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 980 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 975
(6th Cir. 1972); Spratling I, supra note 1, at 481.
11. Secondary meaning has been defined as "a mental recognition in buyers' and
potential buyers' minds that products connected with the symbol or device emanate
from or are associated with the same source." National Football League Properties,
Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 658 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
12. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 824, 827 (3d Cir. 1981);
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 980 (M.D. Tenn.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers
Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); In re Morton-Norwich
Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336-37, 1340 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Doctrine of Functional-
ity, supra note 4, at 552, 560.
13. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981); Schwinn
Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 980 (M.D. Tenn. 1971),
aJf'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289
F.2d 496, 504-05 (C.C.P.A. 1961); cf. Duo-Tint Bulb & Battery Co. v. Moline
Supply Co., 46 Ill. App. 3d 145, 151, 360 N.E.2d 798, 803 (1977) (the doctrine of
functionality precludes exclusive unfair competition protection).
14. E.g., In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 500, 504 (C.C.P.A.
1961); In re Ovation Instruments, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 116, 122-23 (Trademark
Trial & App. Bd. 1978).
15. Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161-62 (2d Cir. 1904) (the bulb shape of a
syringe); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 980, 982
(M.D. Tenn. 1971) (the knurled markings on the inner facing of a bicycle rim), aff'd
per curiam, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972); Luminous Unit Co. v. R. Williamson &
Co., 241 F. 265, 269 (N.D. Ill.) (the canopy and bowl configurations of a light
fixture), affd, 245 F. 988 (1917), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 486 (1919); In re Morton-
Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1341-42 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (the design of a spray
top and overall configuration of a plastic spray bottle); see, e.g., In re Honeywell,
Inc., 532 F.2d 180, 182-83 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (the round configuration of a thermostat
cover); In re Hollaender Mfg. Co., 511 F.2d 1186, 1189 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (the design
of a cast aluminum fitting for joining tubing).
16. Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 553; Note, Developments in the
Law-Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 919 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Competitive Torts]; see Spratling I, supra note 1, at 480 n.180.
1982]
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dard,17 readily holding aesthetic features functional if they are impor-
tant ingredients in the commercial success of a product.',
This Note describes the development of this broad aesthetic func-
tionality standard and argues against its future application. In deny-
ing trademark protection to aesthetic features on the basis of mere
consumer appeal, courts fail to recognize that businessmen in today's
mass marketing economy must select aesthetically pleasing product
features to encourage consumer demand for their products. 9 The
creation of this demand is a recognized trademark function 20 and
therefore should not provide the basis for precluding trademark pro-
tection.
Furthermore, the granting of trademark protection to features that
are merely aesthetically pleasing does not adversely affect free compe-
tition.2 1 In fact, the adoption of this broad aesthetic functionality
standard may have a numbing effect on the imagination involved in
the creation of aesthetically pleasing product features. 22 This Note
argues that aesthetic product features should be deemed functional
only upon a showing that the feature substantially contributes to the
use, efficiency or economy of the product.2 3
17. Note, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 77, 94-95 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Trade Dress Infringement]; Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 561-
62, 564; Competitive Torts, supra note 16, at 919-20; see, e.g., International Order
of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita
Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 662-63 (W.D. Wash. 1982); Damn I'm
Good Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Famolare,
Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 743-44 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd mem., 652
F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981).
18. E.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Damn I'm Good Inc. v.
Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville
Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 743 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir.
1981); see National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear,
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 662 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
19. See Spratling I, supra note 1, at 460-63.
20. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942); Restatement of Torts § 715 comment b (1938); see Spratling I, supra note
1, 455-56, 462-63.
21. See In re Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re
Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich, J., concur-
ring), af'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
22. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981); National
Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp.
651, 663 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
23. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF FUNCTIONALITY
A. Historical Background
The doctrine of functionality developed as a result of a judicial
desire to limit the protection afforded product features under the law
of unfair competition.2 4 At early common law, product features were
not recognized as "technical" trademarks-those inherently distinc-
tive marks deemed worthy of protection immediately upon adoption
and use as an indication of a product's source.25 These features, re-
gardless of their arbitrary nature, were afforded legal protection from
imitation only under the common law of unfair competition, which
required a showing of secondary meaning in the features.2 6
The granting of such protection to product features was recognized
as having a potentially greater anti-competitive effect than the grant-
ing of similar protection to such other identifying symbols as words or
pictures affixed to labels.2 7 An injunction against the imitation of a
word affixed to a label, for example, was thought not to deprive an
infringing competitor of anything of substantial value because the
word could be changed easily to avoid confusion.28 When protection is
accorded a feature that is an integral component of a product, such as
shape or an element of mechanical construction, however, the recipi-
ent of that protection acquires the right to exclude others from utiliz-
ing that feature and thus from producing a similar product.2 9 Conse-
24. Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 551-52. Although at early com-
mon law, only word trademarks, labels and packages were protected under unfair
competition law, id. at 546-49, by the early 1900's courts began to protect product
configurations under unfair competition law as well. Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw
& Stamping Works, 163 F. 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1908); Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v.
Alder, 154 F. 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1907); Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark,
124 F. 923, 927-28 (C.C.D. Conn. 1903), aff'd, 131 F. 240 (2d Cir. 1904).
25. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982);
Spratling I, supra note 1, at 484; see Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 549-
52.
26. Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 549-52. The reasons given for
refusal of trademark protection included the fear that eventually all possible designs
of a particular article would be granted exclusively to various trademark owners,
thus impeding the entrance of competitors into the market for the goods. See In re
Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Spratling I,
supra note 1, at 484.
27. Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 552 & n.50 (discussing Shredded
Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 963-64 (2d Cir. 1918); Flagg Mfg.
Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 91, 59 N.E. 667, 667 (1901)).
28. See Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 963 (2d Cir.
1918).
29. Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 552 n.50 ("[T]he courts were not
to tread upon the substantial right of the defendant to make and sell the same kind of
goods as did the plaintiff.").
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quently, protection of this kind was thought to inhibit the manu-
facture and marketing of goods 30 in an economic system that empha-
sizes vigorous competition. 3'
Thus, the doctrine of functionality was devised to preclude what
were considered potentially perpetual monopolies in product features
that were essential to the use or efficiency of a product. 32 Such "func-
tional" features are legitimate subjects of free competition and should
be accessible for all to imitate33 even though they may have acquired
secondary meaning. 34
The policy concern of encouraging free competition in useful prod-
uct features was incorporated into the law of trademarks, 35 once it
was recognized that product features were capable 36 of trademark
protection 37 if they either were inherently distinctive or had acquired
30. Id. Although the doctrine of functionality seems to have evolved as a response
to protection of product configurations, the policy concerns of the doctrine apply
equally to protection of container configurations. The acquisition of exclusive rights
in either type of configuration may cause a decrease in competition. See Spratling I,
supra note 1, at 457-58.
31. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943); Spratling I, supra note 1, at 464.
32. Daniel v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 231 F. 827, 833-34 (3d Cir. 1916);
Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co., 191 F. 979, 981 (7th
Cir. 1911), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 730 (1912); Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161-
62 (2d Cir. 1904); see Rushmore v. Saxon, 158 F. 499, 507 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908),
modified per curiam, 170 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1909).
33. Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161-62 (2d Cir. 1904); Luminous Unit Co.
v. R. Williamson & Co., 241 F. 265, 269 (N.D. Ill.), affd per curiam, 245 F. 988
(7th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 486 (1919); Doctrine of Functionality, supra
note 4, at 551-52.
34. E.g., In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961); 1
J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:26, at 195-96; Spratling I, supra note 1, at 481 &
n. 183.
35. Spratling I, supra note 1, at 494; see, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus.,
653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co.,
339 F. Supp. 973, 980 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), affd per curiam, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir.
1972); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336-37 (C.C.P.A. 1982);
In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 505 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
36. Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Watson, 150 F. Supp. 861, 863 (D.D.C. 1957); In re
Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Minne-
sota Mining and Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836, 837 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Mogen David
Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 932 (C.C.P.A. 1964), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A.
1967); Ex Parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 230-31 (Comm'r Pat.
1958); see Dannay, The Sears-Compco Doctrine Today: Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, 67 Trademark Rep. 132, 144 (1977); Spratling I, supra note 1, at 467-
68, 493.
37. Under section 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976), a trademark is
defined as "any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them
from those manufactured or sold by others." The statutory definition is essentially the
same as that utilized by the common law. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254
AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY
secondary meaning. 3 Thus, as with unfair competition law, courts
invoked the functionality doctrine to preclude the acquisition of exclu-
sive trademark rights in those product features that were deemed
functional. 39 They concluded that exclusive trademark rights in such
"functional" features should not be awarded to one person even
though the public has come to recognize the feature as an indication of
(1877); see 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 3:1, at 85; Spratling, The Protectability of
Package, Container, and Product Configurations [Part II], 6 U.S.F.L. Rev. 172, 184
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Spratling II]. Although product features are not listed in
the statutory definition of a trademark, they have been held capable of trademark
protection. In re Kotzin, 276 F.2d 411, 414-15 (C.C.P.A. 1960); In re International
Playtex Corp., 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 377, 378 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1967);
see, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(the configuration of a plastic spray bottle for liquid household cleaner); In re
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836, 838 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (the configura-
tion of a chemical solid); In re Superba Cravats, Inc., 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 354, 355
(Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1965) (the black and white color pattern of a hook-on-
band for neckties). The ease with which trademark rights are acquired depends upon
the nature of the mark in question. Inherently distinctive marks, such as fanciful and
arbitrary marks, are afforded legal protection immediately upon adoption and use of
the mark to identify goods. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 16:2, at 569; see, e.g.,
Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1961);
George Washington Mint, Inc. v. Washington Mint Inc., 349 F. Supp. 255, 263
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). For a comprehensive discussion of fanciful and arbitrary marks, see
1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, §§ 11:2-:4. If, however, a mark is merely descriptive of
a purpose, use, size or characteristic of a product, trademark rights will be acquired
only upon a showing of secondary meaning. E.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway
Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495, 498-99 (2d Cir. 1962); Charcoal Steak House, Inc. v.
Staley, 263 N.C. 199, 201-02, 139 S.E.2d 185, 187-88 (1964); 1 J. McCarthy, supra
note 3, § 11:5, at 352-53. Trademark protection affords the owner an exclusive right
to prevent others from using the mark in any way that might create a likelihood of
public confusion as to the true source of the product. E.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96
U.S. 245, 251 (1877); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495,
499 (2d Cir. 1962); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir.
1945); Lanham Act, § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(1976); 2 J. McCarthy, supra note 3,
§ 23:1, at 34-35. Such protection continues until the mark no longer serves its
trademark purpose of identification, either through non-use with intent to abandon
the mark, 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, §§ 17:3, :6, or whenever the mark is so
widely associated with the particular product that it becomes the generic name of the
product. 1 J. Gilson, supra note 3, § 3.06, at 3-101 to 3-102.
38. Oxford Pendaflex Corp. v. Rolodex Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 249, 255,
256 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1979); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:31, at 212-
13; Spratling I, supra note 1, at 493-94.
39. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982); 1
J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:26, at 194; Spratling I, supra note 1, at 494; see, e.g.,
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 980-81 (M.D.
Tenn. 1971)(the knurled markings on bicycle rims were held functional and pre-
cluded from trademark protection), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972);
In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 505-06 (C.C.P.A. 1961)(the shape of
an ore concentrating and coal cleaning table was held functional and precluded from
trademark protection).
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source. 40 Similarly, the importance of free competition with respect to
useful features prevails in the two other areas of intellectual property
law,41 patents42 and copyrights.
43
40. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 980 (M.D.
Tenn. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972); In re Deister Concen-
trator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 502-03 (C.C.P.A. 1961); Spratling I, supra note 1, at 498-
500; see Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); 1 J.
McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:26, at 195-96. Two commentators have suggested that a
functional product feature cannot be inherently distinctive because all similar prod-
ucts are likely to possess the useful feature and therefore, the feature will not appear
in any way distinctive. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:26, at 195; Spratling I, supra
note 1, at 494-95. This argument does not appear persuasive. For example, in In re
Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961), a distinctive rhomboidal
shape of an ore concentrating table was found to be functional. Id. at 498-500.
41. 1 J. Gilson, supra note 3, § 2.13, at 2-101 (noting that all three legal areas of
intellectual property share the basic policy of the functionality doctrine: that the
public interest in free competition prohibits the protectability of functional or utili-
tarian product features).
42. Patent law provides protection for two types of inventions: 1) functional or
useful inventions, 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 6:3, at 127 (construing 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1976)); and 2) non-functional ornamental design inventions relating to articles
of manufacture. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:30, at 208 (construing 35 U.S.C.
§ 171 (1976)). In order to obtain either type of patent, the claimed invention must be
novel and non-obvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1976); see Duo-Tint Bulb & Battery
Co. v. Moline Supply Co., 46 Ill. App. 3d 145, 151, 360 N.E.2d 798, 803 (1977).
Useful inventions are granted protection for seventeen years, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp.
IV 1980), whereas design patents are awarded for the elective terms of three and one
half, seven or 14 years. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1976). The basic policy objective underlying
the patent grant is to encourage technological and industrial advances by assuring the
creator an exclusive right to his invention. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 6:1, at 124;
Spratling I, supra note 1, at 485. Thus, the acquisition of a patent entitles its owner
to exclude all others from making, using or selling his creation (even if another should
by his own efforts discover the same invention at a later time). 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(1976).
43. Copyright law protects the expressions of ideas fixed in tangible form. 17
U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. I 1977). It is only the expression of a particular idea or concept
that is afforded legal protection-the idea itself is dedicated to the public domain.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). All that is required is that the expression,
such as a book, drawing or sculpture, be an original creation of the author. L. Batlin
& Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976);
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951); Doran
v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S.D. Cal. 1961), afJ'd, 304
F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962); see Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868
(1975). The term of copyright protection for works created on or after January 1,
1978 consists of the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death. 17
U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. I 1977). The policy objective in affording this protection is to
encourage artistic and intellectual creativity. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
555 (1973); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc.,
510 F.2d 1004, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). Unlike patent law,
copyright protection does not entitle the owner to prevent others from using the
copyrighted work. 1 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18[A], at 2-195 (2d ed.
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B. Temporary Patent Protection for Utilitarian Product Features
The only exclusive rights allowed in useful product features are
those limited rights available under the utility patent laws. 44 The
temporary nature of utility patent protection is designed to grant only
those rights under the patent laws that are necessary to encourage
technological and industrial advances by assuring inventors some pro-
tection for their creative endeavors. 45 Consequently, courts have held
consistently that a product feature qualifying as primarily functional
and thus protected by a utility patent is ineligible for trademark
protection; 46 utility patent and trademark protection for product fea-
tures are mutually exclusive.4 7 By contrast, because a product feature
that qualifies for a design patent must be non-functional and orna-
mental, design patent and trademark protection are not mutually
exclusive; dual protection in this instance does not violate the public
policy of free competition in functional product features. 48
1982). It merely prohibits the unauthorized reproduction or copying of the work.
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
44. 1 J. Gilson, supra note 3, § 2.13, at 2-101; 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3,
§ 7:26, at 195; see Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d 1195, 1199
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
45. See Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 6:1, at 124;
Spratling I, supra note 1, at 485.
46. In re Honeyvell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1347-48 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1080 (1974); In re Shenango Ceramics, Inc., 362 F.2d 287, 292 (C.C.P.A.
1966); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:29, at 207; see Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus
Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S.
111, 119-20 (1938). Typically, the question of dual protection arises in the context of
one who attempts to acquire a trademark for a feature that is already the subject of a
patent, see In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964), aff'd, 372
F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967), or a feature for which patent protection has expired. See
In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974).
47. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:29, at 207; see In re Honeywell, Inc., 497
F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974).
48. In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1080 (1974); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 928-30 (C.C.P.A.
1964), afid, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967). In In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328
F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967), the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals held that the existence of design patent protection did
not preclude trademark protection for a wine bottle shape. Id. at 928-30. The lower
court had denied registration, contending that the granting of trademark protection
in the shape would extend the patent monopoly beyond the 17 year period of patent
protection. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in holding the lower court in
error for denying registration, stressed the distinct concepts and purposes underlying
the patent and trademark laws and found no valid reason why the two protections
could not subsist at the same time in the same configuration. Id. More recently, in In
re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974),
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, again emphasizing the distinction between
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C. Limitations on the Copyrightability of Utilitarian Expressions
The importance placed on the free accessibility of useful product
features in trademark and patent law has a counterpart in copyright
law: the doctrine enunciated in Baker v. Selden.49 The doctrine pro-
vides that if the use of an idea embodied in a copyrighted expression
requires the reproduction of the expression itself, such reproduction
does not constitute an infringement.50 Thus, in Baker the Court held
that the use of blank accounting forms, which represented a new
bookkeeping system, did not constitute an infringement because re-
production of those forms was necessary to the use of the system.
Furthermore, the doctrine has been applied to permit the construction
of a building from another's copyrighted architectural plans. 52 The
policy rationale for this doctrine parallels the rationale underlying the
doctrine of functionality. Expressions that are necessary to the use of
ideas, methods or systems should not be monopolized under the copy-
right laws; they should be freely accessible for all to use. 53
D. Potential Conflicts Between Trademark Protection and Design
Patent Protection for Product Designs
It has been argued that trademark protection should not be ac-
corded product features for which protection under the design patent
or copyright laws has expired or been denied.5 4 Because patent and
the bases of patent and trademark law, held that the lower court had erred in
refusing trademark registration for a thermostat cover configuration because it previ-
ously had been protected under a design patent. Id. at 1347-49.
49. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
50. Id. at 102-04; 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 43, § 2.18[B], at 2-199. See generally
id. § 2.18[A]-[D].
51. 101 U.S. at 102-04 (1879).
52. DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 195-96 (M.D. Fla.
1962); see Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th
Cir. 1971)(the doctrine applied to allow the copying of a jewelry pin in the shape of a
bee); Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)(the
doctrine applied to allow copying of a traffic system embodied in a drawing illustrat-
ing a novel approach to unsnarling traffic congestion). Other courts have interpreted
Baker to hold that if only limited ways exist in which to express an idea, those
expressions are not capable of copyright protection. E.g., Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967)(doctrine applied to reject the copyright-
ability of contest instructions); Decorative Aides Corp. v. Staple Sewing Aides Corp.,
497 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(doctrine applied to reject the copyrightability of
instruction sheet for hanging drapery), affd, Nos. 80-7658, 80-7668 (2d Cir. March
9, 1981).
53. 101 U.S. at 102-04. As is the case with utilitarian product features, the right
to copy useful works will be restricted only under the patent laws. Id. at 103.
54. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945); Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 117-20 (1938); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3,
§ 7:33, at 217-18, 219-20; Dannay, supra note 36, at 137; Derenberg, Symposium-
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copyright protection originate from the Constitution, which requires
that those protections be limited in duration, 55 the granting of poten-
tially indefinite trademark rights, 56 which originate at common law,5 7
would extend the rights in a design for which protection has expired
beyond the constitutionally prescribed period.5 Furthermore, in the
Sears-Compco decisions, 59 the Supreme Court held that an unpatent-
Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1192, 1201-02 (1964);
Spratling 1I, supra note 37, at 182-83, 185-88; see Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964).
55. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 6:1, at 122; see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8
("[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries").
56. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539, 543 (C.C.P.A. 1967)(Smith,
J., concurring). See supra note 36.
57. Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190, 193, 23 N.E. 1068, 1069 (1890); Mc-
Clure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69
Trademark Rep. 305, 314-16 (1979); Pattishall, Two Hundred Years of American
Trademark Law, 68 Trademark Rep. 121, 123-28 (1978); see Spratling I, supra note
1, at 467.
58. Derenberg, supra note 54, at 1201; see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:24, at 190; Spratling
II, supra note 37, at 178.
59. Compeo Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). The Court held that the federal
patent and copyright laws preempted state common-law protection for product
features. Compco, 376 U.S. at 237-38; Sears, 376 U.S. at 230-32; see 1 J. Gilson,
supra note 3, § 2.13, at 2-100; 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:24, at 190-92;
Dannay, supra note 36, at 135-37; Spratling II, supra note 37, at 178. Accordingly,
in both Sears and Compco, the Court refused to enjoin the copying by competitors of
certain lamp features ineligible for design patent protection despite evidence of
secondary meaning and consumer confusion as to the source of the lamp. Compco,
376 U.S. at 238; Sears, 376 U.S. at 232-33. Initially, these decisions were interpreted
as eradicating all state unfair competition and trademark protection for product
features. I J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:25, at 192-93; Dannay, supra note 36, at
137. Furthermore, those who argued that Lanham Act registration only extends to
trademarks that qualify for protection under state common law suggested that the
Sears-Compco decisions precluded federal trademark registration of product features
as well. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:33, at 217-18; Spratling II, supra note 37, at
182-83; see Dannay, supra note 36, at 137. Recent decisions, however, have refused
to interpret the two cases so broadly. Le Sportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc.
478 F. Supp. 602, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Spratling II, supra note 37, at 192-94; see
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d
Cir. 1979); Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 639-41 (2d Cir. 1979),
remand opinion rev'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982);
Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1214, 1215 n.6 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); National Football League Properties, Inc. v.
Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 663 (W.D. Wash. 1982). The
notion that the Sears-Compco doctrine bars federal trademark protection for product
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able or uncopyrightable product design is in the public domain, and
thus state law may not prevent its imitation by others. 60 Under the
Sears-Compco philosophy, therefore, protection should not be af-
forded to product features that do not reach a level of invention
sufficient to qualify for design patent protection."' The theory under-
lying the arguments against granting trademark protection both to
designs for which patent or copyright protection has expired, as well
as to unpatentable or uncopyrightable designs, is that upon the expira-
tion or denial of patent or copyright protection, product designs must
be irretrievably returned to or left in the public domain.6 2
features has been rejected. Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F.
Supp. 689, 692-93 (N.D. Ga. 1976); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539,
542-45 (C.C.P.A. 1967)(Smith, J., concurring); Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Mine
Safety Appliances Co., 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 163, 166-67 (Trademark Trial & App.
Bd. 1964); see Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc.,
510 F.2d 1004, 1013-14 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S 868 (1975); Dannay, supra
note 36, at 144-45; Spratling II, supra note 37, at 201. Language in the Compco case
that "if the design is not entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory
protection, then it can be copied at will," 376 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added), has been
interpreted as allowing trademark protection for product configurations registered
under the federal Lanham Act. 3 R. Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition,
Trademarks and Monopolies § 77.4(e)(5), at 411-12 (3d ed. 1969)[hereinafter cited as
R. Callmann I]; Dannay, supra note 36, at 144-45; Spratling II, supra note 37, at
192-93. Similarly, the unfair competition section of the Lanham Act has been in-
voked to provide protection for unregistered trademarks as well as other state unfair
competition claims involving product features. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co.,
601 F.2d 631, 642 (2d Cir. 1979), remand opinion rev'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d
538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives
Labs., Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982); Le Sportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc.,
478 F. Supp. 602, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 1 J. Gilson, supra note 3, § 2.13, at 2-100;
Dannay, supra note 36, at 144. Some courts have explicitly rejected the suggestion
that the Sears-Compco doctrine preempts state common-law trademark protection.
See Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1214-1215 & n.6 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). In actuality then, the Sears-Compco doc-
trine only preempts state common-law unfair competition and trademark protection
that is equivalent to a patent or copyright. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601
F.2d 631, 642 (2d Cir. 1979), remand opinion rev'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d 538
(2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs.,
Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982); Dannay, supra note 36, at 142-43.
60. Compco, 376 U.S. at 237-38; Sears, 376 U.S. at 230-32; see Ives Labs., Inc.
v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 642 (2d Cir. 1979), remand opinion rev'd on other
grounds, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982); P. Rosenberg, Patent Law
Fundamentals § 4.05, at 4-28.13 to 4-29 (rev. 2d ed. 1982); Spratling II, supra note
37, at 178-79.
61. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:24, at 190-92; Spratling II, supra note 37, at
178; see Compco, 376 U.S. at 237-38; Sears, 376 U.S. at 230-32.
62. Compco, 376 U.S. at 237-38; Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32; 1 J. McCarthy, supra
note 3, § 7:24, at 190; Spratling II, supra note 37, at 185-88; Spratling I, supra note
1, at 514 n.399.
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Courts and commentators have rejected these arguments on various
grounds. 63 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has rejected the
claim that granting trademark protection to a product feature for
which design patent protection has expired would extend the patent
monopoly.64 The court in In re Mogen David Wine Corp.,65 noted
that the underlying purpose and nature of the rights afforded under
the patent laws are separate and distinct from those protected under
trademark law:
[T]rademark rights . . . which happen to continue beyond the
expiration of a design patent, do not "extend" the patent monop-
oly. They exist independently of it, under different law and for
different reasons. The termination of either has no legal effect on
the continuance of the other. When the patent monopoly ends, it
ends. The trademark rights do not extend it. 6
The purpose of encouraging invention of ornamental designs under
the federal design patent laws67 is fulfilled by the granting of a pat-
ent. 8 Upon expiration of the patent right in a product feature that is
non-functional and serves primarily as a means to distinguish the
goods of the trademark owner from those of others, a new and sepa-
rate interest arises-preventing public confusion as to the source of
goods. 69 Thus, the granting of trademark protection to unpatentable
63. See Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689,
692 (N.D. Ga. 1976); In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1347-49 (C.C.P.A.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539,
542 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Smith, J., concurring); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328
F.2d 925, 927-30 (C.C.P.A. 1964), afj'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Electric
Storage Battery Co. v. Mine Safety Co., 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 163, 166-67 (Trade-
mark Trial & App. Bd. 1964); 3 R. Callmann I, supra note 59, § 77.4(e)(5), at 411-
12; Dannay, supra note 36, at 144-45; Spratling II, supra note 37, at 192-94;
Spratling I, supra note 1, at 514 & n.399.
64. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 928-30 (C.C.P.A. 1964)
(existing design patent for wine decanter shape), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A.
1967); see In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1347-48 (C.C.P.A.) (expired design
patent for thermostat cover design), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974).
65. 328 F.2d 925, 929-30 (C.C.P.A. 1964), afj'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
66. Id. at 930; accord Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210,
1215 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); In re Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 565
F.2d 679, 683 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289
F.2d 496, 501 & n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
67. In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1080 (1974); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 6:1, at 124; Spratling I, supra note
1, at 485.
68. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539, 543 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Smith,
J., concurring); see Spratling I, supra note 1, at 514 n.399.
69. In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1080 (1974); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539, 545 (C.C.P.A.
1967) (Smith, J., concurring).
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features or features for which design patent protection has expired
should not be considered an additional reward to the originator. In
fact, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has held that the
public interest in being protected from confusion overrides "any al-
leged extension of design patent rights. ' 70
Furthermore, the notion that the expiration or denial of design
patent protection must irretrievably place product designs in the pub-
lic domain and thus preclude trademark protection has been re-
jected.71 Some courts and commentators have contended that patent
law does not grant an unrestricted right to copy those features that it
returns to or leaves in the public domain.7 2 Rather, the patent laws
merely restrict for a limited time the inherent right of the public to
copy product features; 73 they do not, upon expiration, create an af-
firmative right to copy.74 Moreover, it has been suggested that the
public domain concept is merely a legal construct determined only
after consideration of various legal rights afforded product features,
including trademark protection. 75 Thus, features denied design patent
protection, or for which design patent protection has expired, may be
afforded trademark protection provided the requirements for such
protection are met.76
70. In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1080 (1974).
71. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:33, at 220; Spratling II, supra note 37, at
188-89; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 22-23, 9 Wheat. 1, 50-51 (1824); Mine
Safety Appliances Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901, 902 n.2
(C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 n.3 (C.C.P.A.
1961).
72. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 22-23, 9 Wheat. 1, 50-51 (1824); In re Mogen
David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 930 (C.C.P.A. 1964), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539
(C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 n.3 (C.C.P.A.
1961); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:33, at 220; Spratling II, supra note 37, at
188-89.
73. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901,
902 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 930
(C.C.P.A. 1964), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Deister Concentrator
Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1961); Spratling II, supra note 37, at 188, 190
n.485.
74. Sprafling II, supra note 37, at 188 (footnote omitted).
75. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901,
902 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
76. See In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1347-49 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1080 (1974); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 928-30
(C.C.P.A. 1964), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A
& A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 692-94 (N.D. Ga. 1976). Similarly, designs
for which copyright protection has expired have been afforded trademark protection.
Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (character illustrations in children's books for which copyright protection ex-
pired were afforded trademark protection because the characters identified the crea-
tor of the storybooks).
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Although the functionality doctrine recognizes the need to preclude
protection for useful product features that may have been protected
under a utility patent for a limited period, 77 the basis for precluding
protection is the concern that useful product features should be freely
accessible and not that an inherent conflict between the utility patent
and trademark laws exists. 78 The functionality doctrine more discrimi-
nately assigns to the public domain that which is most appropriate-
useful product features that are important enough to competition to
require their accessibility for public use.71
E. The Utilitarian Standard
The earliest standard of functionality has been described as a
strictly utilitarian approach.80 Only those features absolutely neces-
sary to a product's use were considered functional. 81 In addition, the
only features deemed functional were elements of the mechanical
construction of a product, 2 such as the longitudinal corrugations of a
rubber hose,83 the mouth-piece and rotary fan of a vacuum cleaner, 84
and the canopy shade of a light fixture. 5 Thus, most early decisions
77. In re Honeyvell, Inc. 497 F.2d 1344, 1347-48 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1080 (1974); see Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256
(1945); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 117-20 (1938).
78. In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1347-48 (C.C.P.A.)("When federal
trademark rights have been sought for functional subject matter disclosed in a utility
patent. . . the acquisition of such rights will not be allowed in view of the 'overrid-
ing public policy of preventing their monopolization, of preserving the public right to
copy.' "), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974); accord Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 413 F.2d 1195, 1199 (C.C.P.A. 1969). But see Sylvania Elec. Prods. v.
Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730, 733 n.2 (3d Cir. 1957); 1 J. McCarthy, supra
note 3, § 7:26, at 194-95; cf. Duo-Tint Bulb & Battery Co. v. Moline Supply Co., 46
Ill. App. 3d 145, 151, 360 N.E.2d 798, 803 (1977) (conflict between patent and
unfair competition law).
79. In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1080 (1974); see, e.g., Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161-62 (2d Cir. 1904);
In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504-05 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
80. Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 552-53; see Keene Corp. v.
Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers
Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
81. Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904); Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Luminous Unit Co. v.
R. Williamson & Co., 241 F. 265, 269 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curiam, 245 F. 988 (7th
Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 486 (1920); Doctrine of Functionality, supra note
4, at 552-53, 558-59; Competitive Torts, supra note 16, at 919.
82. Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 553; Competitive Torts, supra
note 16, at 919.
83. See Daniel v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 231 F. 827 (3d Cir. 1916).
84. Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co., 191 F. 979 (7th
Cir. 1911), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 730 (1912).
85. Luminous Unit Co. v. R. Williamson & Co., 241 F. 265 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per
curiam, 245 F. 988 (7th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 486 (1920).
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found product designs or configurations functional if the features were
of a mechanical or technical nature essential for: 1) the successful
practical use of the product; 86 2) the efficiency of the product; 87 3) the
structural construction of the product;88 or 4) the most economical
manufacture of the product.89 Most courts did not analyze aesthetic
product features when determining functionality.90 Aesthetic features
were probably not considered essential to the use or efficiency of a
product.9' One court, however, expressly distinguished "between imi-
tating the functional and mechanical construction essential to the
proper operation or making of the device and imitating the general
form and appearance or ornamentation essential to commercial suc-
cess from the standpoint of taste and attractiveness. '92
After the publication of the First Restatement of Torts in 1938,13 a
broader standard of functionality was adopted by courts, supplanting
the strictly utilitarian approach to non-aesthetic product features.9 4
Although essential utilitarian features were still deemed functional,
the Restatement approach did not limit a finding of functionality to
essential features alone. 95 According to section 742 of the Restatement:
86. Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904); Luminous Unit Co. v.
R. Williamson & Co., 241 F. 265, 269 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curiam, 245 F. 988 (7th
Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 486 (1920); Doctrine of Functionality, supra note
4, at 552.
87. Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904); Luminous Unit Co. v.
R. Williamson & Co., 241 F. 265, 269 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curiam, 245 F. 988 (7th
Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 486 (1920); Doctrine of Functionality, supra note
4, at 552.
88. Daniel v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 231 F. 827, 833-34 (3d Cir. 1916); see
Keystone Type Foundry v. Portland Publishing Co., 180 F. 301, 303 (C.C.D. Me.
1910), afJ'd, 186 F. 690 (1st Cir. 1911); Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at
553 & n.56.
89. Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. MeCrum-Howell Co., 191 F. 979, 981
(7th Cir. 1911), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 730 (1912); Diamond Expansion Bolt Co. v.
United States Expansion Bolt Co., 177 A.D. 554, 563, 164 N.Y.S. 433, 439 (1917);
Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 554.
90. Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 553; Competitive Torts, supra
note 16, at 919; see Luminous Unit Co. v. R. Williamson & Co., 241 F. 265, 269
(N.D. Ill.) (the "unique and attractive style" of a light fixture bowl was considered
an indicia of origin; its functionality was not analyzed), aff'd per curiam, 245 F. 988
(7th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 486 (1920).
91. See Rushmore v. Saxon, 158 F. 499, 507 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), modified per
curiam on other grounds, 170 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1909).
92. Id.
93. Restatement of Torts § 742 (1938).
94. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 824-25 (3d Cir. 1981); Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Doctrine
of Functionality, supra note 4, at 558-60; see In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671
F.2d 1332, 1340 (C.C.P.A. 1982). Today, the strictly utilitarian approach is a
minority view. See Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 562-63.
95. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 824-25 (3d Cir. 1981).
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"A feature of goods is functional ... if it affects their purpose, action
or performance, or the facility or economy of processing, handling or
using them; it is non-functional if it does not have any of such ef-
fects."' 6 Comment a to section 742 states that a feature may be
functional if it contributes to the efficiency or economy of manufac-
ture or to the utility, durability or effectiveness with which goods
serve their function. 97 Thus, this approach still may be described as
utilitarian, but it does not require a product feature to be essential in
order to be functional. A feature is functional if it merely contributes
to or affects a utilitarian or useful purpose of the goods.9 8
Today, although most courts cite the Restatement approach, 99 they
require that a feature be "primarily and essentially dictated by func-
tional or utilitarian considerations" in order to be deemed func-
tional. 00 Under this requirement the feature's mere possession of a
96. Restatement of Torts § 742 (1938) (emphasis added). This section was
omitted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts because the developing fields of
unfair competition and trade regulation had become less reliant on tort law. Keene
Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 824 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing 4 Restatement
(Second) of Torts 1-2 (1979) (Introductory Note)).
97. Restatement of Torts § 742 comment a (1938).
98. Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 558.
99. E.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 981
(M.D. Tenn. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972); Zippo Mfg. Co.
v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); In re Deister
Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 500 (C.C.P.A. 1961); Moore Business Forms, Inc.
v. National Computer Sys., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 909, 915 (Trademark Trial &
App. Bd. 1981); Duo-Tint Bulb & Battery Co. v. Moline Supply Co., 46 I. App. 3d
145, 152, 360 N.E.2d 798, 803 (1977). Under the Restatement approach, a greater
number of features will be found functional than under the strictly utilitarian ap-
proach, and consequently, a greater number of product features will be freely
imitated. Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 560.
100. This requirement was originally enunciated in In re Deister Concentrator
Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961). In that case, the rhomboidal configuration
of an ore concentrating and coal cleaning table was considered in essence utilitarian
and incapable of trademark protection. Id. at 506. Subsequent cases have followed
this standard of functionality. See, e.g., In re Hollaender Mfg. Co., 511 F.2d 1186,
1187-89 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Ovation Instruments, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 116,
122-23 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1978). Recently, however, the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals has updated its definition of functionality. A functionality
determination requires an analysis of utility based upon design superiority and should
emphasize the importance of the design to free competition. In re Morton-Norwich
Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340 (C.C.P.A. 1982). For a configuration to be
utilitarian according to this view, it must be superior in function or economy of
manufacture. Id. at 1339. Furthermore, once such superiority is demonstrated, no
showing that the feature is essentially functional is required. See id. at 1343 n.4.
The court rejected the Restatement of Torts § 742 definition of functionality, noting
that a finding of functionality upon mere contribution to utility or durability was too
broad. Id. at 1340. The court suggested several factors to consider in determining
the superior utility of a product feature: 1) the existence of an expired utility patent
disclosing any utilitarian advantages of a configuration or any advertising by the
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useful function is not sufficient to preclude protection. ' 0' Those factors
considered by courts as weighing in favor of functionality include the
difficulty with which alternative designs may be substituted for the
feature,102 and whether the feature is a significant component of the
product that contributes to the product's use. 0 3 In addition, an over-
riding factor considered by a majority of courts is whether granting
protection would have a potentially adverse effect on free competi-
tion. 10 4 Consequently, this emphasis on free competition allows the
courts greater latitude in determining the functionality of features in
particular factual situations. 10 5
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY
In the past, aesthetics may not have been as important an ingredi-
ent of products as it is today. 0 8 Before the advent of mass marketing,
consumers bought goods in local shops, in which the choice of prod-
ucts was limited.10 7 By contrast, today's consumer may be required to
choose from among many functionally equivalent products placed
side by side on the shelves of a large supermarket. 08 Thus, the appear-
ance of a product or container can be important to the differentiation
and identification of goods. 109
-manufacturer stressing the utility of the configuration; 2) the availability of alterna-
tive configurations; and 3) the economy of manufacture of a particular design. Id. at
1340-41. The court, in applying this standard, found the configuration of a plastic
spray container non-functional in that it was not a functionally or economically
superior design. Allowing protection would not hinder competition in that numerous
other designs were available to perform the same purpose. Id. at 1342.
101. E.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825-26 (3d Cir. 1981);
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d
Cir. 1979); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d
496, 502 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
102. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); In re
World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012, 1014 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
103. See In re Ovation Instruments, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 116, 122 (Trade-
mark Trial & App. Bd. 1978).
104. E.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981);
Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332,
1339-40 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
105. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964)
(Rich, J., concurring), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Doctrine of Functional-
ity, supra note 4, at 560.
106. See Galbally, Unfair Trade in the Simulation of Rival Goods-The Test of
Commercial Necessity, 3 Vill. L. Rev. 333, 333 (1958).
107. See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L.
Rev. 813, 818 n.21 (1927) (quoting 1 H.G. Wells, The World of William Clissold
237-38 (1926)).
108. See Spratling I, supra note 1, at 460.
109. See generally id. at 456-58, 460-63.
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Trademark protection has been accorded to aesthetic product fea-
tures to the extent that the decorative or ornamental feature's primary
purpose is to identify and distinguish goods from others." 0 For exam-
ple, trademark protection has been granted to an ornamental candy
bar wrapper,' a decorative striped pattern on athletic shoes,' 1 2 and
an attractive key design for jewelry.' 3
In the early 1900's, under the strictly utilitarian standard applied
by the majority of courts, aesthetic features were not considered
essential to the use or efficacy of the products they adorned and thus
were not considered under the doctrine of functionality." 4 In addi-
tion, one court implicitly rejected the functionality of aesthetic fea-
tures." 5 Nevertheless, two courts applied a functionality analysis to
aesthetic product features." 6 The approach utilized, however, was
significantly dissimilar to that applied to non-aesthetic features.1
7
This new standard provided that an aesthetic feature may be freely
copied if the design or configuration is desired by the public for its
pleasing appearance." 8 Thus, the shape of a musical instrument was
allowed to be imitated on the ground that the instrument was de-
signed in part because of the public's desire for instruments in that
form.' ' Similarly, one court stated in dictum that a design is func-
tional if buyers choose an article partially because of its design.
120
110. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:6, at 162.
111. In re World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
112. In re Dassler, 134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 265 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1962).
113. In re Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
114. See Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 553; Competitive Torts, supra
note 16, at 919. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
115. Rushmorev. Saxon, 158 F. 499, 507 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), modified on other
grounds per curiam, 170 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1909).
116. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. A.R. Mosler & Co., 233 F. 112, 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1916); Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 91, 59 N.E. 667, 667 (1901); see
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216.F. Supp. 670, 693-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 553; Competitive Torts, supra note 16, at
919.
117. See Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 17, at 94; Doctrine of Functional-
ity, supra note 4, at 561-62; Competitive Torts, supra note 16, at 919-20.
118. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. A.R. Mosler & Co., 233 F. 112, 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1916); Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 91, 59 N.E. 667, 667 (1901).
119. Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 91, 59 N.E. 667, 667 (1901). The
court, however, required the defendant to clearly mark his products as his own to
prevent consumer confusion as to the manufacturer of the instrument. Id., 59 N.E.
at 667.
120. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. A.R. Mosler & Co., 233 F. 112, 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1916). The plaintiff sued the defendant for unfair competition for copying the design
of plaintiff's spark plugs. The court's holding concerned the mechanical aspects of the
plug. Id. For further discussion of this case and its view of aesthetic functionality, see
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 693-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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The modern aesthetic functionality standard was formulated in the
1940's and 1950's, perhaps due to certain courts' reliance on a refer-
ence to aesthetic features in comment a of section 742 of the Restate-
ment of Torts,12 1 which provides that aesthetic features are functional
if they contribute to the aesthetic value of products that are purchased
primarily for that value. 122 The United States Courts of Appeals for
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits enunciated a broad approach in deter-
mining aesthetic functionality, holding that an aesthetic feature is
functional if it "is an important ingredient in the commercial success
of the product."'123 Aesthetic functionality, under their view, is based
solely on the consumer appeal of the aesthetic design without any
consideration of the utilitarian value of the feature. 124
In the 1941 case of J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Mercantile Co.,'25 the
Eighth Circuit held that the distinctive rounded-corner, bib-pocket
design on overalls, which prevented the accumulation of dirt, was
functional and could be imitated. 26 The court stated that a design
may be functional if it contributes materially to the salability or
commercial success of the product. 2 7 Similarly, in Pagliero v. Wallace
China Co. ,128 the Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin the defendant from
copying the floral patterns on the plaintiff's hotel china. 29 In finding
the design functional, 30 the court emphasized: "[O]ne of the essential
selling features of hotel china, if, indeed, not the primary, is the
design. The attractiveness and eye-appeal of the design sells the
china.' 3' Consequently, the floral designs were important to the
121. Restatement of Torts § 742 comment a (1938); see Pagliero v. Wallace China
Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1952) (citing the Restatement of Torts § 742
comment a (1938) as support for its holding); J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercan-
tile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941) (same); Trade Dress Infringement, supra
note 17, at 94 n.134; Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 561; Competitive
Torts, supra note 16, at 919-20. The more recent case of Famolare, Inc. v. Melville
Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir.
1981), also invoked this comment as supporting its aesthetic functionality standard.
122. Restatement of Torts § 742 comment a (1938). The comment states: "When
goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be functional [in
that they] aid the performance of an object for which the goods are intended." Id.
123. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952); accord J.
C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941); Trade
Dress Infringement, supra note 17, at 94.
124. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981).
125. 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941).
126. Id. at 954.
127. Id.
128. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
129. Id. at 343-44.
130. Id. at 343.
131. Id. at 343-44.
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commercial success of the china and could be freely copied by compet-
itors.' 32 The court enunciated a broad definition of functionality:
"Functional" in this sense might be said to connote other than a
trade-mark purpose. If the particular feature is an important ingre-
dient in the commercial success of the product, the interest in free
competition permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or
copyright. On the other hand, where the feature or, more aptly,
design, is a mere arbitrary embellishment, a form of dress for the
goods primarily adopted for purposes of identification and individ-
uality and, hence, unrelated to basic consumer demands in connec-
tion with the product, imitation may be forbidden .... Under
such circumstances, since effective competition may be undertaken
without imitation, the law grants protection. 133
The court's distinction between features that are important ingredi-
ents in the commercial success of products and those that are arbitrary
embellishments which merely identify goods fails to acknowledge two
important factors: 1) An arbitrary and identifying embellishment may
materially contribute to a product's success;' 34 and 2) a trademark in
itself materially contributes to a product's commercial success, 135 and
thus "a trademark may always be construed as having a quasi-func-
tional aspect.' 36 Conceivably, the factual context of the case may
have influenced the court's broad holding. The unfair competition
claim for the protection of the floral design was coupled with a
trademark infringement claim for the plaintiff's trademarked words,
which described the flowers in the design. 137 Having preliminarily
enjoined the defendant's use of the trademarked words, 38 the court
may have concluded that the plaintiff was provided with sufficient
protection. 1 39 Although it appears that the court addressed the issue of
132. Id.
133. Id. at 343 (footnotes omitted).
134. See Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1981) (distinc-
tive symbols used in the manufacture of a toy car had "tremendous sales potential");
Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 774, 776-77 (9th Cir. 1981)
(distinctive pattern "demonstrated in the marketplace a certain consumer appeal");
Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D. Hawaii 1979) (the
"distinctive appearance of ... wavy-bottom soles" substantially contributed to the
commercial success of the shoes), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981).
135. See Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 774, 776-77 (9th
Cir. 1981).
136. Hefter, Trademark Law Unsettled on Design Functionality, Legal Times of
Washington, Sept. 28, 1981, at 26, col. 4.
137. 198 F.2d at 341.
138. Id. at 344.
139. The plaintiff also could have obtained copyright protection for the floral
designs to the extent that they were original expressions fixed in a tangible form. See
supra note 43.
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functionality in the context of an unfair competition claim, 140 recent
decisions have adopted this approach with respect to trademark in-
fringement claims as well.14'
Despite the enunciation of a broad aesthetic functionality standard
in the 1940's and early 1950's, few courts dealt with the issue during
the late 1950's and the 1960's.142 Since the early 1970's, however, the
aesthetic functionality standard adopted in Pagliero has been em-
braced by numerous courts which have found aesthetic product fea-
tures functional and have thus precluded trademark protection for
those features. 143
In Ventura Travelware, Inc. v. Baltimore Luggage Co., 44 the
federally registered design trademark of a raised plastic band on
luggage consisting of five symmetrical stripes, alternating in color,
was held functional because its attractiveness substantially contrib-
uted to the luggage's salability. 45 In Famolare, Inc. v. Melville
140. 198 F.2d at 343.
141. E.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); National Football League
Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 662 (W.D.
Wash. 1982). See infra notes 143-74 and accompanying text.
142. Two courts that did address the issue were Bliss v. Gotham Indus., 316 F.2d
848 (9th Cir. 1963) and Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). In Bliss a claim for unfair competition was denied because the court
held that a kitchen pitcher design was functional based on Pagliero's standard. 316
F.2d at 855. The court's analysis was conclusory and it is of interest to note that
earlier in the decision, in holding invalid the plaintiff's design patent for the configu-
ration, the court remarked that the pitcher had no particular aesthetic appeal. Id. at
850. In Zippo, the Southern District of New York, noting the broad scope of
Pagliero's aesthetic functionality standard, 216 F. Supp. at 693, appeared reluctant
to adopt that standard completely. It held that "a feature of goods is functional at
least if it affects their purpose, action, or performance, or the facility or economy of
processing, handling, or using them, and possibly also if it affects the buyer's choice
because of its pleasing appearance." Id. at 695 (emphasis added). Nevertheless,
certain aspects of the design of a cigarette lighter were found functional based solely
on utilitarian grounds. Id. at 696-97. The court did not reach the issue of aesthetic
functionality, although it indicated that had the standard been applied, it would
have required a finding of functionality in certain design features that would not
have been found functional under the narrower utilitarian standard. Id. at 698-99.
143. See International Order of Job's Daughers v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Damn I'm Good Inc.
v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Famolare, Inc. v.
Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 62
(9th Cir. 1981); PPS, Inc. v. Jewelry Sales Representatives, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 375,
384 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ventura Travelware, Inc. v. Baltimore Luggage Co., 66 Misc.
2d 646, 650-51, 322 N.Y.S.2d 93, 100 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 A.D.2d 794, 328
N.Y.S.2d 811 (1972).
144. 66 Misc. 2d 646, 322 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 A.D.2d 794, 328
N.Y.S.2d 811 (1972).
145. Id. at 649-50, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 98-99. A color per se is not capable of
trademark protection. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:16, at 178-79. The reason
given for this principle is that only a limited number of colors exist, and thus the
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Corp. '146 the unique, wavy-bottom sole design of shoes was held
functional because the design substantially contributed to the com-
mercial success of the shoes.147 Had the court applied the utilitarian
standard, it would have been compelled to find the design non-
functional and capable of trademark protection because it was clear
that the "design was dictated by stylistic not anatomical consider-
ations." 48 The District Court for the Southern District of New York,
in Damn I'm Good Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc. ,'49 similarly found an
aesthetic feature functional based on Pagliero's aesthetic functionality
standard. 50 For five years, the plaintiff had manufactured bracelets
inscribed with the words "Damn I'm Good," and had recently at-
tached tags bearing the phrase to its jewelry. 51 The court concluded
that the inscription was functional because its appeal as an "ego
booster" was a crucial ingredient in the success of the product.1
5 2
granting of trademark protection would result in the eventual monopolization of all
colors. Id. at 179. A color or combination of colors may be protected, however, if
used in connection with some arbitrary design that indicates the source of goods.
Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co., 512 F. Supp. 1184, 1188 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Ventura
Travelware, Inc. v. Baltimore Luggage Co., 66 Misc. 2d 646, 649, 322 N.Y.S.2d 93,
98-99 (Sup. Ct. 1971), af'd, 38 A.D.2d 794, 328 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1972). In Ventura,
the colored stripe design, aside from being found functional, was held to be neither
distinctive nor arbitrary, and was therefore incapable of trademark protection. Id.
at 650, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
146. 472 F. Supp. 738 (D. Hawaii 1979), afj'd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981).
147. Id. at 744.
148. Id. at 742 n.2.
149. 514 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
150. Id. at 1360, 1362.
151. Id. at 1358-59. Defendants produced similar bracelets bearing the same
inscription. Id.
152. Id. at 1362. This holding seems to stress a consumer demand for the product
for reasons other than pure aesthetics. The aesthetics of a jewelry design, however,
was the determining factor in the case of PPS, Inc. v. Jewelry Sales Representatives,
Inc., 392 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), which involved similar facts. Plaintiff
claimed a common-law trademark in the phrase "I Like You" inscribed on jewelry.
Id. at 378. The court refused to grant a preliminary injuction against imitation of
the phrase on the jewelry products of others because the design might be a functional
element directly contributing to the general sale of the product. "A potential buyer
... may be more motivated by the item's design and aesthetic features than by its
source." Id. at 384. In Damn I'm Good Inc., the court also relied on evidence
suggesting that consumers did not associate the bracelets with Damn I'm Good Inc.
specifically, but rather with a division of the company or its designer, and thus the
mark did not serve as an identifying symbol. 514 F. Supp. at 1362. It is well
established, however, that secondary meaning requires public association of a mark
with a single, though anonymous, source: "This does not mean that the buyer knows
the identity of that 'single source' in the sense that he knows the corporate name of
the producer or seller. In fact, few buyers know, or care about, the corporate
identity of the seller of a trademarked product." 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 15:2,
at 520 (emphasis in original). The issue of secondary meaning is considered indepen-
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This trend was taken a step further by the Ninth Circuit in Interna-
tional Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co.,' 53 in which the
collective mark' 54 of a women's fraternal organization was held to be
aesthetically functional when used as a design on jewelry. 55 Thus,
even though the organizational emblem had been used by the organi-
zation on its own jewelry as an indication of source, 5 6 the defendant
was allowed to produce jewelry bearing the identical embleml 57 be-
cause the emblem had been "merchandised on the basis of [its] intrin-
sic value, not as a designation of origin or sponsorship."' 58 The court
noted that this intrinsic value was represented in the phenomenon that
consumers "commonly identify [themselves] by displaying emblems
expressing allegiances"' 5 9 to organizations, schools and sports teams. 60
The court thus held the emblem functional with respect to its use as a
design on jewelry because it had commercial appeal as a mode of
expressing allegiance;' 6' the feature "constitute[d] the actual benefit
that the consumer wishe[d] to purchase.' '1 62
The practical difficulties of a strict application of Pagliero's con-
sumer appeal standard are reflected in certain courts' adoption of new
dently of functionality, Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir.
1981), and when a feature is found functional, trademark protection is precluded,
despite evidence of secondary meaning. Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F.
Supp. 738, 744-45 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981); In re
Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 502 (C.C.P.A. 1961). Thus, even if Damn
I'm Good Inc. had shown secondary meaning in the inscription, the finding of
aesthetic functionality would have required the same result.
153. 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981).
154. A collective mark is a "trademark or service mark used by the members of a
cooperative, an association or other collective group or organization and includes
marks used to indicate membership in a union, an association or other organization."
Lanham Act, § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976). In International Order, the terms
"collective mark" and "trademark" were used interchangeably. 633 F.2d at 914 n.2.
155. 633 F.2d at 918.
156. Id. at 914. The evidence indicated that since 1921, the organization had
licensed at least one jeweler to manufacture jewelry jearing the emblem, and the
organization itself sold some of the jewelry directly to its members. Id.
157. See id. at 920.
158. Id. at 918.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. The court further stated: "It would be naive to conclude that the ...
emblem is desired because consumers believe that the product somehow originated
with or was sponsored by the organization." Id. Contra Boston Professional Hockey
Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.) (granting
injunctive relief for the copying of a federally registered hockey team emblem trade-
mark used in the design of jerseys), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). In Boston
Hockey, the court noted that "the embroidered symbols [were] sold not because of
any ... aesthetic characteristic but because they are the trademarks of the hockey
teams." Id. at 1013. Boston Hockey implies that consumer demand based on a desire
to express allegiance is part of the trademark value of the mark.
162. 633 F.2d at 917.
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factors as weighing against what otherwise would be a finding of
functionality under the broad aesthetic functionality standard. Thus,
in Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises,163 the Ninth Circuit
intimated that application of Pagliero's standard alone may not sup-
port a finding of functionality in cases involving well known, federally
registered aesthetic trademarks. 164 The aesthetic feature in question-
the letters "LV" surrounded by floral symbols-covered the entire
surface of the plaintiff's handbags and other related products. 6 5 The
defendant produced a line of similar merchandise using almost the
identical design but changed the "LV" to "LY."' 66 In reversing the
district court's granting of summary judgment for the defendant, 67
the Ninth Circuit suggested an additional factor that may weigh
against a finding of functionality. The court noted that if the aesthetic
feature increases the product's consumer appeal because of consumers'
association of the feature with the quality of the goods or prestige of
owning the product, then the design is serving the legitimate trade-
mark function of identification and should be accorded protection. 16 8
The recent case of National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wi-
chita Falls Sportswear, Inc. 169 involved the copying by competitors of
replicas of National Football League jerseys bearing team names, city
and regional designations, and names of team players. 170 Despite the
factual similarity to International Order, which held an organiza-
tional emblem functional,' 7 ' the court seemed to find the descriptive
terms on the jerseys non-functional because they were not "that aspect
of [the] product which satisfies [the] consumers' tastes for beauty.' 1 72
Furthermore, the court departed- from the traditional functionality
163. 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981).
164. Id. at 773-74.
165. Id. at 772.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 771. The court reversed a lower court finding of aesthetic functional-
ity, disagreeing that "any feature of a product which contributes to the consumer
appeal and saleability of the product is, as a matter of law, a functional element of
that product. Neither Pagliero nor the cases since decided . . . impel such a conclu-
sion." Id. at 773. Pagliero was distinguished as not involving a federally registered
trademark. Id. Furthermore, the aesthetic appeal of the design was not sufficiently
important to the success of the product to support a finding of functionality, despite
the court's acknowledgment that aesthetics is a factor in the consumer appeal of
handbags and "Vuitton has without doubt succeeded in appealing to consumers with
its products." Id. at 774.
168. Id. at 776.
169. 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
170. Id. at 655-56.
171. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981). See supra notes 153:62 and
accompanying text.
172. 532 F. Supp. at 663 (quoting Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644
F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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doctrine, holding that even though a feature is functional, it may be
afforded protection under trademark law if it has acquired secondary
meaning and, therefore, serves a trademark purpose.1 73 Since the
plaintiffs had shown such a trademark significance, copying of the
features was enjoined.17 4
Further confusion regarding the functionality of aesthetic features
is reflected in those cases addressing unfair competition claims that
have cited Pagliero's standard, yet determined the functionality of
aesthetic features based upon a separate analysis of the operational
utility or efficiency provided by the feature. 175 In Artus Corp. v.
Nordic Co., 70 the colors signifying the varying thicknesses of shims
separating milling machinery parts were held non-functional. 77 Al-
though the court cited Pagliero's aesthetic functionality standard, it
found that the colors did not relate to the shims' leveling ability as to
machinery parts and, therefore, were entitled to protection provided
that they had acquired secondary meaning.17 Similarly, in Le Sport-
sac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc. ,79 the various features of travel
bags, such as the straps and zippers, were held merely decorative and
thus non-functional. 80 The court cited Pagliero's standard,' 81 yet
based its functionality determination on evidence that the bags served
their function of carrying articles-irrespective of the width of the
straps or the hollowness of the zippers.182 Finally, in Ives Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 8 3 the Second Circuit cited Pagliero's
173. Id. at 663. The court cited dictum in International Order of Job's Daughters
v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941
(1981), for this proposition. However, a well-established principle of the functional-
ity doctrine states that if a feature is functional, it is incapable of trademark protec-
tion even if the feature has acquired secondary meaning. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex
Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F.
Supp. 738, 744-45 (D. Hawaii 1979), af-f'd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981); In re
Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 502 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
174. 532 F. Supp. at 663-64.
175. See, e.g., Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 642-43 (2d Cir.
1979), remand opinion rev'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182
(1982); Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co., 512 F. Supp. 1184, 1189 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Le
Sportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 602, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
176. 512 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
177. Id. at 1189.
178. Id.
179. 478 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
180. Id. at 608.
181. Id. at 606-07.
182. Id. at 608.
183. 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979), remand opinion rev'd on other grounds, 638
F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives
Labs., Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982).
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standard yet affirmed' 84 the lower court's holding that the pale blue
and blue-and-red color coatings of certain drug capsules were func-
tional on the basis of their psychological and identification utility.8 5
The evidence indicated that the colors reduce patients' anxiety and
confusion as to which drug they are ingesting and assist physicians in
identifying the drug in instances of overdose. 86 On certiorari, 8 7 the
Supreme Court did not reach the issue of functionality, 8 although it
did enunciate a functionality standard based upon whether the prod-
uct feature was either "essential to the use or purpose of the article
or ... affect[ed] the cost or quality of the article." 8 9
Finally, two courts have added to the uncertainty in this area by
purporting to apply the broad aesthetic functionality standard to non-
aesthetic product features. 9 0 In determining the functionality of the
shapes of a one-piece compact telephone' 9' and a trailer truck, 92 these
courts have cited Pagliero's standard, 93 and yet have analyzed these
184. Id. at 643-44. The court affirmed the lower court's denial of plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction against imitation of the colors. Id. On remand,
the district court found the colors functional and allowed their imitation. Ives Labs.,
Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 488 F. Supp. 394, 398, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), remand
opinion rev'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982). On
appeal, the Second Circuit disregarded the lower court's finding of functionality and
enjoined imitation. 638 F.2d 538, 545 n.1 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mulligan, J., dissenting),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 102 S. Ct.
2182 (1982).
185. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939, 949-50 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979), remand opinion rev'd on other grounds,
638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Inwood Labs., Inc. v.
Ives Labs., Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982).
186. Id.; see Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1982)
(White, J., concurring).
187. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982).
188. Id. at 2190. The Court held that the Second Circuit had erred in setting
aside the district court's finding that defendants' had infringed plaintiff's trademark
under § 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976), and remanded the case. As
to the unfair competition claims that were not addressed by the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court remanded these claims for further proceedings. 102 S. Ct. at 2190.
189. Id. at 2186 n.10.
190. Leisurecraft Prods., Ltd. v. International Dictating Equip., Inc., 210
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.,
536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
191. Leisurecraft Prods., Ltd. v. International Dictating Equip., Inc., 210
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
192. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
193. Leisurecraft Prods., Ltd. v. International Dictating Equip., Inc., 210
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1217-18 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
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non-aesthetic features under the traditional utilitarian approach.' 4
The indiscriminate adoption of the aesthetic functionality approach
with respect to engineering or mechanical product features would
represent an unwarranted extension of the broad aesthetic functional-
ity standard beyond its initially intended scope. 195
III. CRITICISM OF THE BROAD AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY STANDARD
A. Rejection of the Standard
The adoption of a broad aesthetic functionality standard in recent
years has caused uncertainty in the area of product and container
configuration trademarks 96 and has been criticized by several
sources. 197 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has rejected a
functionality standard based on ornamentation'" alone. 9 In In re
194. The court in Leisurecraft Prods., Ltd. v. International Dictating Equip.,
Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (D.C. Cir. 1981), held that the form of a telephone
was functional because "[t]he shape [was] essential to its function as a one-piece
compact telephone." Id. at 194. Similarly, the court in Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976), held the
exterior design of a truck non-functional based on an engineer's report as to the
construction and use of the design: "The entire side skin of the rear of the trailer...
is useless. The way it is set up its only function will be to gather road dirt and mud."
Id. at 1218.
195. This development can be traced, perhaps, to the fact that Pagliero's broad
definition of functionality does not specifically mention aesthetics or confine its scope
to aesthetic features: Rather, any feature of importance to the consumer appeal of
the product would seem to fit Pagliero's test of functionality. See Pagliero v. Wallace
China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952). However, the historical development
of the functionality doctrine, see Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 17, at 94, as
well as the factual context of Pagliero-the case involved the functionality of a floral
design on hotel china, clearly an aesthetic design-indicate that this broad standard
was not intended to replace the classical utilitarian approach to functionality. Trade
Dress Infringement, supra note 17, at 94-95; Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4,
at 564.
196. Hefter, supra note 136, at 26, col. 1. See supra pt. II.
197. E.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981);
Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261, 271 (S.D. Cal. 1954); 3
R. Callmann I, supra note 59, § 77.4 (e)(1), at 386 n.98; Trade Dress Infringement,
supra note 17, at 88 & n.85.
198. In rejecting this standard, the court has consistently used the phrase "orna-
mentation function" of product features. It appears that "ornamentation function" is
synonymous with aesthetic functionality. See Trade Dress Infringement, supra note
17, at 88 n.85.
199. In re Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Mogen
David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 932-33 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich, J., concurring),
aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 17, at 88
n.85. Only months after Mogen David was decided, however, Judge Rich, writing
for the C.C.P.A. in In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A.
1964), seemed to leave the door open for some type of aesthetic functionality. In
granting trademark protection for a configuration of a chemical solid, he noted that
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Mogen David Wine Corp. ,200 the court rejected the claim that a wine
decanter shape was functional because of its pleasing appearance. 20'
Judge Rich, in his frequently cited concurring opinion, noted: "[There
is] an essential distinction between engineering function and orna-
mentation function .... [E]ven if we assume some value behind the
specific design in an aesthetic sense, it is not in the least essential to use
it in order to have a fully functioning bottle or an attractive bottle
.... 202 Rich's rejection of a broad aesthetic functionality standard
was reinforced recently by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
in In re Penthouse International Ltd.2 0 3 In affording trademark pro-
tection for a stylized key design on jewelry, the court noted that a
design "may have the function of attracting purchasers, but the shape
of ... jewelry. . . is arbitrary and nonessential to a functioning piece
of jewelry. 2 0 4
Several federal courts have rejected either implicitly or explicitly
the application of a broad aesthetic functionality standard.20 5 Certain
courts implicitly reject the application of the aesthetic functionality
standard by applying the traditional utilitarian standard to aesthetic
features.20 6 For example, one district court held that an attractive grill
and a hood ornamentation of an automobile were non-functional in
that they were not primarily utilitarian.20 7
In an early case,208 a California federal district court explicitly
rejected the functionality of an attractive ashtray design, stating that
there had been no "indication that [the triangular configuration] was adopted pri-
marily to be ornamental, or to make the goods easier to pack or to use or to make, or
even more saleable. We deem it to be entirely arbitrary until the contrary be
shown." Id. at 840. Although the court more recently has expressly acknowledged the
bifurcated approach to mechanical and aesthetic product features adopted by certain
courts, see In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc. 671 F.2d 1332, 1338 n.1 (C.C.P.A.
1982), it has yet to refute its established utilitarian approach to aesthetic product
features.
200. 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
201. Id. at 931. The case was remanded for a determination of the existence of
secondary meaning in the mark. Id. at 932.
202. Id. at 933 (Rich, J., concurring).
203. 565 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
204. Id. at 682.
205. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981); Rolls-
Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 692 (N.D. Ca. 1976);
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 981 (M.D. Tenn.
1971), aJf'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972); Haeger Potteries, Inc. v.
Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261, 271 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Note, The Public Interest
and the Right to Copy Nonfunctional Product Features, 19 Win. & Mary L. Rev.
317, 322 & n.32 (1977).
206. See Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 692
(N.D. Ga. 1976); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973,
980-81 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), afj'd per curiam, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972).
207. Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 692
(N.D. Ga. 1976).
208. Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
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"[i]f the aesthetic quality of the form were held to be functional, then
every feature of a product, even the ornamental and nonutilitarian,
would be functional. 20 9 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries"10 has clearly rejected the broad
aesthetic functionality standard, noting that it discourages the pro-
duction of new aesthetic product features. 21' In Keene, the design of
an outdoor wall-mounted luminaire was held functional based upon a
utilitarian approach to aesthetic features. 212 The court noted:
[T]he inquiry should focus on the extent to which the design feature
is related to the utilitarian function of the product or feature.
When the design itself is not significantly related to the utilitarian
function of the product, but is merely arbitrary, then it is entitled
to protection as a ... trademark. 2 13
The court considered the luminaire design intrinsically related to the
luminaire's function in that part of a luminaire's utility lies in its
"architectural compatibility" with the structure on which it is
mounted. 1 4 Thus, the luminaire design was found functional because
it significantly contributed to the actual use of the product.
Various commentators have noted the extremely broad scope of the
aesthetic functionality standard, 2 5 and two have expressly questioned
its application." 6 They have criticized the arbitrary, ambiguous 217
and impracticable 218 nature of this standard.
209. Id. at 271. The claim in this case was for unfair competition in the imitation
of plaintiff's pottery ashtray design. The court, defining "functional" as relating to
the "natural, proper or characteristic" action of the article in question, held the
design non-functional and enjoined its imitation: "The 'natural, proper or character-
istic' action of an ashtray is to hold ashes. Its shape or form, so long as not substan-
tially affecting utility for holding ashes, is clearly not functional." Id.
210. 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
211. Id. at 825.
212. Id. at 826.
213. Id. at 825.
214. Id. at 826.
215. Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 17, at 88; Doctrine of Functionality,
supra note 4, at 562; see 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:26, at 198; 3 R. Callmann
I, supra note 59, § 77.4(e)(1), at 386 n.98.
216. 3 R. Callmann I, supra note 59, § 77.4(e)(1), at 386 n.98; Trade Dress
Infringement, supra note 17, at 88.
217. See 3 R. Callmann I, supra note 59, § 77.4(e)(1), at 386 n.98 ("Unless the
concept of functionality is limited to those features which clearly affect the process of
manufacture or the mechanics of use, there is a danger of losing all distinction
between functional and nonfunctional features. The distinction becomes especially
meaningless when we label as functional any feature that contributes to consumer
appeal ....").
218. See Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 17, at 88-89.
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B. Inherent Flaws of the Broad Aesthetic Functionality Standard
Under the developing broad aesthetic functionality standard, courts
have been finding aesthetic product features functional too readily.2 19
An "aesthetic" product feature is presumed to contribute materially to
the salability of a product, 2 0 necessitating a finding of functionality
and thereby permitting the imitation of product features.2 2 1 Further-
more, this conclusory approach fails to recognize that, in certain
instances, the granting of trademark protection to aesthetic product
features does not have an adverse effect on competition. 222
Indeed, under this approach, an attractive design adopted and used
to distinguish one's goods and thus serving as a valid trademark may
be in danger of losing its legal protection whenever it becomes an
important ingredient in the commercial success of a product.2 23 Courts
fail to recognize that product and container designs are often chosen
by manufacturers as trademarks specifically for their aesthetic ap-
peal22 4 because trademarks, in addition to identifying and distinguish-
219. See International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Bliss v. Gotham Indus., 316
F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1963); Damn I'm Good Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp.
1357, 1362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738,
743-44 (D. Hawaii 1979), af'd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981); PPS, Inc. v.
Jewelry Sales Representatives, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ventura
Travelware, Inc. v. Baltimore Luggage Co., 66 Misc. 2d 646, 650-51, 322 N.Y.S.2d
93, 100 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 A.D.2d 794, 328 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1972).
220. See, e.g., Bliss v. Gotham Indus., 316 F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1963); Damn
I'm Good Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); PPS, Inc.
v. Jewelry Sales Representatives, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Ventura Travelware, Inc. v. Baltimore Luggage Co., 66 Misc. 2d 646, 650-51, 322
N.Y.S.2d 93, 99-100 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 A.D.2d 794, 328 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1972).
221. See, e.g., Bliss v. Gotham Indus., 316 F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1963); Damn
I'm Good Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); PPS, Inc.
v. Jewelry Sales Representatives, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Ventura Travelware, Inc. v. Baltimore Luggage Co., 66 Misc. 2d 646, 650-51, 322
N.Y.S.2d 93, 99-100 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 A.D.2d 794, 328 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1972).
222. In re Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Mogen
David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich, J., concurring), aff'd,
372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967). Indeed, many courts do not attempt any careful
analysis of the possible competitive effect that would result from according protec-
tion. See, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633
F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Bliss v. Gotham Indus.,
316 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1963); PPS, Inc. v. Jewelry Sales Representatives, Inc., 392 F.
Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
223. See, e.g., International .Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633
F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Damn I'm Good Inc. v.
Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville
Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981).
224. In re Ovation Instruments, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 116, 121 (Trademark
Trial & App. Bd. 1978) (rounded bowl shape of a guitar chosen for its selling and
identification potential); Spratling I, supra note 1, at 462-63.
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ing a particular product, also serve an advertising function by materi-
ally contributing to the sale of the product. 22 5
The advertising function of trademarks has taken on added impor-
tance with the advent of large, impersonal marketing centers.226 To-
day, a consumer is likely to be confronted in a large self-service
supermarket with a great number of similarly functioning items.2 27 To
compete effectively, a manufacturer will often devote a vast amount
of time, money and effort to develop a product or container design
that will differentiate his product from other similar products and
encourage purchasers to choose his particular brand. 28 An aestheti-
cally pleasing product or container design is, therefore, an important
element in today's competitive economy 229 because it performs both of
these functions.2 30 Consequently, a manufacturer chooses a particular
aesthetic design specifically to create consumer demand for his prod-
uct, yet ironically, if his feature achieves success in creating that
demand, he will be denied the exclusive right to his mark under the
broad aesthetic functionality standard. Perhaps recognizing this
catch-22, courts recently have been reluctant to find valid, federally
registered, aesthetically pleasing trademarks functional, although a
strict application of the broad aesthetic functionality standard would
have demanded such a finding.23'
The utility that the doctrine of functionality seeks to protect is the
operational utility of a product feature:2 32 If a design is important in
the actual use or efficiency of a product, the public interest demands
225. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205, 208 (1942); Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 54, 296
N.Y.S. 176, 179 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Restatement of Torts § 715 comment b (1938); 1 J.
McCarthy, supra note 3, § 3:5, at 95-96; P. Rosenberg, supra note 60, § 4.01, at 4-3;
Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in the Market
Place [Part 1], 64 Trademark Rep. 75, 78-79 (1974).
226. See Spratling I, supra note 1, at 461-62.
227. See id. at 460.
228. See id. at 461-63.
229. See id. at 462.
230. See id. at 459 n.29, 462-63.
231. See Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir.
1981) (decorative floral design was found not aesthetically functional because it did
not contribute significantly enough to the success of the handbags and related prod-
ucts despite the court's acknowledgment of the importance of aesthetics to the
commercial appeal of handbags and the established appeal of Vuitton handbags);
National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. 651, 662-63 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (finding the descriptive terms on football
jerseys non-functional as not satisfying the consumers' tastes for beauty despite a
finding of functionality on similar facts in International Order of Job's Daughters v.
Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981)).
See supra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
232. 1 [1981-1982] Trademark Law Handbook § 3.01[1], at 22.
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free competition in that feature. 233 The inherent flaw in a consumer
appeal standard that finds sales utility of a product feature disposi-
tive 234 is that, by definition, a finding of this kind of utility ipso facto
precludes a valid trademark function. Today, the creation of con-
sumer demand for a product should be perceived as a significant
trademark function.2 35 In fact, evidence of the commercial success of a -
product has been considered by some courts to be a factor weighing in
favor of granting trademark and patent rights.
2 36
Furthermore, the underlying policy concern of the functionality
doctrine with respect to mechanical features is with promoting free
competition as to features relating to the practical, operational use of
a product. 237 The granting of exclusive rights in a merely desirable
233. See, e.g., Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904); In re Pent-
house Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Mogen David Wine
Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964)(Rich, J., concurring), af'd, 372 F.2d 539
(C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 500 (C.C.P.A.
1961). See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
234. 1 [1981-1982] Trademark Law Handbook § 3.01[1], at 22 (salability is not
functionality).
235. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205, 208 (1942); Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 54-55,
296 N.Y.S. 176, 179 (1937); Restatement of Torts § 715 comment b (1938). As
suggested by one commentator, the "creation and retention of consumer demand is a
significant function of trademarks in today's billion dollar advertising market."
1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 3:5, at 96.
236. Evidence of the large sales volume of a product may be used as a factor in
establishing the existence of secondary meaning in a trademark. Car-Freshner Corp.
v. Auto Aid Mfg. Corp., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 233, 238 n.10 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); North
Carolina Dairy Found. v. Foremost-McKesson, 92 Cal. App. 3d 98, 109-10, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 794, 801 (Ct. App. 1979). But see 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, §§ 15:15-:16,
at 546-49 (evidence of the large sales volume of a product is only relevant, circum-
stantial evidence from which secondary meaning may be inferred; commercial suc-
cess may result from other factors that have no effect of creating an association
between the public and a specific producer). In addition, some courts have consid-
ered the commercial success of a patented article as a factor in establishing the non-
obviousness and thus, the validity of utility and design patents. 1 D. Chisum, Patents
§ 1.04 [2], at 1-135 to 1-136 (1981); 2 D. Chisum, supra, § 5.05[2], at 5-246 to 5-247;
see, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966); L.E. Sauer Mach.
Co. v. Corrugated Finishing Prods., Inc., 642 F.2d 203, 206-07 (7th Cir. 1981);
Eutectic Corp. v..Metco, Inc., 579 F.2d 1, 4 & n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
867 (1978); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Sweetheart Plastics, Inc., 436 F.2d 1180,
1187 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 942 (1971). One commentator, however, has
noted that the commercial success of a patented product may not be particularly
probative in determining the non-obviousness of a patent. 2 D. Chisum, supra, §
5.05 [2], at 5-247. For a comprehensive discussion of commercial success as a factor
in determining the non-obviousness of a patent, see Boyer, Commercial Success as
Evidence of Patentability, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 573 (1969); Note, Subtests of "Non-
obviousness"- A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1169,
1175-77 (1964).
237. Daniel v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 231 F. 827, 833-34 (3d Cir. 1916);
Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co., 191 F. 979, 981 (7th
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aesthetic design, however, does not adversely affect free competi-
tion. 238 Competition may, in fact, be promoted by granting such
rights because manufacturers may be stimulated to develop even more
aesthetically pleasing designs. 239
Moreover, a standard that conclusively relies on a determination as
to whether a product feature is an important ingredient in the com-
mercial success of a product is inherently impracticable. A functional-
ity analysis under this approach requires an examination as to what
motivates consumers to buy a particular product, and thus involves
rather difficult determinations regarding consumers' taste and per-
sonal preference.2 40 Consequently, a court may be required to make
subjective judgments as to artistic merit, taste and aesthetic appeal.2 41
Finally, the broad aesthetic functionality standard has been criti-
cized generally as having a potentially numbing effect on the creativ-
ity and imagination involved in the development of aesthetic product
features. 242 Unfortunately, a manufacturer may be deterred from
creating an aesthetically appealing product feature for fear that once
it materially contributes to his product's salability, he will be denied
protection for that feature.2 43
IV. PROPOSAL: APPLICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL UTILITARIAN
STANDARD TO AESTHErIC PRODUCT FEATURES
The aesthetic functionality standard adopted by a growing number
of courts is overbroad.2 44 A proper balance of the competing policy
Cir. 1911), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 730 (1912); Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161
(2d Cir. 1904); Rushmore v. Saxon, 158 F. 499, 507 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), modified
on other grounds per curiam, 170 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1909); Luminous Unit Co. v. R.
Williamson & Co., 241 F. 265, 269 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curiam, 245 F. 988 (1917),
cert. denied, 253 U.S. 486 (1919).
238. In re Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Mogen
David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich, J., concurring), aff'd,
372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967); see Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d
769, 777 (9th Cir. 1981).
239. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich,
J., concurring), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
240. Competitive Torts, supra note 16, at 920; see 3 R. Callmann I, supra note 59,
§ 77.4(e)(1), at 386 n.98; Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 17, at 95. In
addition, recognition of the impracticability of this standard would also halt the
recent application of the consumer appeal test to non-aesthetic mechanical product
features. See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
241. See Competitive Torts, supra note 16, at 920.
242. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981); see
National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. 651, 662-63 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
243. Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981); National
Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp.
651, 662-63 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
244. See Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 17, at 88; Doctrine of Functional-
ity, supra note 4, at 562.
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concerns underlying any functionality analysis dictates the application
of a narrower and more practicable approach.
A. Policy Concerns Dictate a Narrower Approach
A functionality inquiry, with respect to the preclusion of trademark
protection,2 45 should balance three basic policies: 246 1) the public's
interest in free competition;2 47 2) consumer protection in preventing
confusion and deception as to the source of a product; 248 and 3) the
property rights of the trademark owner in his identifying mark.2 49 The
importance of the goal of free competition is rooted in the belief that
imitation stimulates competition, thereby promoting economic pro-
245. The functionality doctrine may also preclude other, more general unfair
competition protection such as trade-dress protection and protection against the
palming off of one's goods as those of another. See, e.g., Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby
Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1979) (trade dress claim), remand opinion
rev'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub noma.
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982); Bliss v. Gotham
Indus., 316 F.2d 848, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1963) (palming-off claim). Since trademark
law is but a part of unfair competition law, the same basic policy considerations
apply to both types of claims. Thus, whether a finding of functionality precludes
trademark or trade-dress protection, the basic policies of consumer protection and
protection of the businessman from the appropriation of his goodwill should be
weighed. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 2:1, at 43-44.
246. In determining the breadth of a functionality standard that will preclude
trademark protection, the trademark policies of consumer and trademark owner
protection, S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274-75, must be weighed against the policy of free competition,
which underlies the functionality doctrine. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying
text.
247. E.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981);
Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 743 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd
mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co.,
339 F. Supp. 973, 980 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), aJfd per curiam, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir.
1972); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
248. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912,
919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers
Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274-75.
249. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912,
919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274-75; Restatement of
Torts, Introductory Note to ch. 35, at 536-40 (1938); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, §
2:1, at 43-44; see Pattishall, supra note 57, at 121. Similarly, under unfair competi-
tion law, one policy consideration is the right of a businessman to secure the fruits of
his labor from misappropriation by competitors. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports,
Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 2:1, at
43-44; McClure, supra note 57, at 305. Thus, even in cases of unfair competition
claims this second policy concern should be considered. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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gress.250 The functionality standards applied to both aesthetic and
non-aesthetic product features recognize the importance of the princi-
ple of free competition. 251 The functionality standard applied to aes-
thetic features is broader, and thus precludes protection more readily
than the standard applied to mechanical features. 2512 And yet, the
threat to free competition with respect to aesthetic features is less than
it is with respect to mechanical features.25 3 Because the range of
possible aesthetic designs and configurations is as infinite as are the
tastes that desire them, 25 4 according trademark protection to aesthetic
features would not greatly hinder competition. 25
In addition, the granting of trademark protection to an aesthetic
feature allows the owner only a limited right;25 6 he can prevent only
250. American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501
(C.C.P.A. 1961); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 1:15, at 33-35; Spratling I, supra
note 1, at 464; Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 566 n. 158; see Keene Corp.
v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981).
251. Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1981)
(aesthetic feature); Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161-62 (2d Cir. 1904) (mechani-
cal feature); National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear,
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 662 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (aesthetic feature); Damn I'm Good
Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); Famolare,
Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 743-44 (D. Hawaii 1979) (same), aff'd
mem., 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d
1332, 1339-42 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (mechanical feature); In re Deister Concentrator
Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (same).
252. See 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:26, at 198; Doctrine of Functionality,
supra note 4, at 562.
253. See In re Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re
Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich, J., concur-
ring), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
254. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964)
(Rich, J., concurring), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
255. In re Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Mogen
David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich, J., concurring), aff'd,
372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
256. There has been a tendency to perceive exclusive trademark rights as evil,
anti-competitive monopolies, similar to those guarded against by the antitrust laws.
See 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 2:5, at 50; Brown, Advertising and the Public
Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale L.J. 1165, 1206 (1948); Mc-
Clure, supra note 57, at 308. Under such a view, a broad functionality doctrine that
precludes such monopolies would be favored. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus.,
653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981). A persuasive argument has been made, however,
that trademarks are not competitively destructive "monopolies" as the term is com-
monly understood. Artype, Inc. v. Zappulla, 228 F.2d 695, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1956);
Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 56-57, 296 N.Y.S. 176,
181-82 (1937); 1 J. Gilson, supra note 3, § 1.03 [5], at 1-29; see Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 821 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980); McClure, supra note 57, at
307-08; Pattishall, supra note 57, at 138, 142-43. Indeed, the legislative history of
the Lanham Act indicates that the drafters perceived trademark protection as dis-
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confusingly similar use of his mark by others.257 Furthermore, the
inability to imitate aesthetic features may, in fact, stimulate competi-
tors to produce a more attractive feature.2 5 8
To the extent that courts too readily find aesthetic product features
functional, the danger of consumer confusion as to the true source of
products increases.2 59 When an aesthetic feature is accorded trade-
mark protection, the public is provided with "a device of identifica-
tion which it did not have before. 2 60 If aesthetic features are consist-
ently denied trademark protection, all competitors will be able to
utilize the identical aesthetic feature in their products,2 6 ' and pur-
chasers will not be able to make knowledgeable choices among various
competing products. 2 12 In addition, the manufacturer's right to be
protected from such confusion in trade2 63 should outweigh the possi-
ble harm resulting from depriving competitors of the right to imitate
an arbitrary feature that does not contribute significantly to the prod-
uct's use.2 4 Moreover, unless limited exclusive rights are accorded
couraging monopolies by stimulating competition rather than creating monopoly
situations. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274-75. Justice Holmes is cited for the proposition that trademark
protection does not involve the creation of a monopoly but rather it only provides its
owner with the right to prevent confusingly similar use of his mark. Id. at 3,
reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 1275.
257. See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274-75; 1 J. Gilson, supra note 3, § 1.03 [5], at 1-29 to 1-30. See
supra note 36.
258. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich,
J., concurring), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967); see Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J.
Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 1981).
259. See, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633
F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); In re Deister
Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1961). The drafters of the Lanham
Act acknowledged this factor in stating that a major purpose of the Trademark Act
was "to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product
bearing a ... trade-mark ... it will get the product which it asks for and wants to
get." S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1274, 1274; see Younker v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
901, 904 (Ohio 1963).
260. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 1:16, at 37.
261. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:26, at 195-96; Spratling I, supra note 1, at
481.
262. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1274, 1275; see Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 821 n.5
(9th Cir. 1980).
263. A manufacturer's right is often substantial because his mark may acquire
significant financial value. See United Drug Co. v. Parodney, 24 F.2d 577, 579
(E.D.N.Y. 1928) ("Theoretically and perhaps practically as well this hard-earned
right is as important as money in the bank. It should not be taken, or even nibbled
away, by another ...."); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 2:9, at 65-66 (in the
valuation of a business, the goodwill represented by a trademark is considered).
264. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (Rich,
J., concurring), aff'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
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these features, money may not be spent on creating aesthetic features
because there will not be "an adequate return on investment in crea-
tive business activities if everyone is free to copy the results when
made public."2 6 5
Given the public interest in the prevention of consumer confusion,
the trademark owner's valid property interest in his identifying mark,
and the possible pro-competitive effects of according trademark
rights, a narrow functionality standard should be applied to preclude
trademark protection only if an adverse effect on the competitive
process would result.26 6 Only when an aesthetic feature is of substan-
tial value in the use or efficiency of a product does society have a
definite interest in preserving the freedom to utilize that feature. 2 7
B. Clothing Designs
The proposed narrow standard would not apply, however, to cloth-
ing designs.2 68 Clothing designs consistently have been excluded from
any practical protection. 269 Although copyright protection for fabric
designs printed on clothing has been allowed, 270 copyright protection
traditionally has been denied for dress design.27' Courts similarly have
refused unfair competition protection to designers from the conced-
edly unjust appropriation of their designs..272 Finally, although design
265. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 1:16, at 37 (discussing protection for trade-
marks in general).
266. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1964)
(Rich, J., concurring) ("Whether competition would in fact be hindered is really the
crux of the matter."), a-f'd, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
267. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981); Marvel
Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904).
268. "Clothing design" or "dress design" as used in this Note refers to the overall
shape, cut or style of an article of clothing as distinguished from fabric design, which
refers to the design imprinted on the fabric. See 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 43,
§ 2.08[H][1], at 2-124.
269. Millinery Creators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d
Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 469 (1941); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279,
279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930); see American Safety Table
Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 271-72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959);
Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 373, 384 (N.D. Ili. 1979),
aff'd, No. 79-1451 (7th Cir. Jan. 30, 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980).
270. Irving J. Dorfman Co. v. Borlan Indus., 309 F. Supp. 21, 23 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142, 143
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
271. Millinery Creators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d
Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 469 (1941); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279,
279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930); Verney Corp. v. Rose Fabric
Converters Corp., 87 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
272. American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 271-72 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959); see Millinery Creators' Guild v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 1940), afJ'd, 312 U.S. 469 (1941); Cheney Bros.
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patent protection is technically available for such designs, the short-
lived, seasonal nature of most clothing designs makes the acquisition
of a patent either impracticable or meaningless.27 3 In addition, often
the originality involved in the production of a new dress design does
not reach the level of novelty and non-obviousness required for patent
protection..2 74 Thus, original clothing designs may be copied freely by
competitors, leaving their creators without recourse.2 75 The policy
consideration for denial of protection for fashion designs stems from
the judicial concern that designer styles be available to the less afflu-
ent purchaser through inexpensive copies.2 76
v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728
(1930); Verney Corp. v. Rose Fabric Converters Corp., 87 F. Supp. 802, 804
(S.D.N.Y. 1949); 1 R. Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade-marks
§ 16.3, at 253-58 (2d ed. 1950 & Supp. 1965) [hereinafter cited as R. Callmann II].
273. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930); Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F.
Supp. 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
274. Millinery Creators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d
Cir. 1940), aJJ'd, 312 U.S. 469 (1941); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279,
279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930); Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros.
Stores, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 373, 384 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd, No. 79-1451 (7th Cir.
Jan. 30, 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980).
275. Millinery Creators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d
Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 469 (1941); see 1 R. Callmann II, supra note 272, § 16.3,
at 253.
276. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 999 (2d Cir.
1980) (Weinstein, J., dissenting). Similarly, this judicial concern for the accessibility
of inexpensive copies of clothing designs may be shared by Congress. Congress has
considered providing a new form of copyright protection for ornamental designs of
useful articles in what would have been Title II of the Copyright Act of 1976. H.R.
Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5659, 5662-63. Noting the lack of appropriate protection for these designs
under the patent and copyright laws, the Senate has repeatedly passed legislation
providing for five year protection for ornamental designs of useful articles. H.R.
Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5659, 5662-63; e.g., S. Rep. No. 473, tit. II, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161
(1975). To date, however, the proposed legislation has not been adopted by the full
Congress because several issues require further examination: the designation of the
protection as copyright protection; the procedural machinery required by the legisla-
tion; and whether the benefits of creating such protection would outweigh "the
disadvantage of removing such designs from free public use." H.R. Rep. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5663.
The proposed legislation was aimed at circumventing the Supreme Court decision in
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), which held that only designs capable of standing
as works of art separate from the useful articles in which they are incorporated are
copyrightable. In addition, the legislation would provide protection for designs not
reaching the level of invention required for a design patent. H.R. Rep. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5663.
Even under this proposed legislation, however, protection for "three-dimensional
features of ... apparel" has been expressly excluded. S. Rep. No. 473, tit. II, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1975).
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C. Practical Application of a Utilitarian Standard
to Aesthetic Product Features
A functionality standard with respect to aesthetic product features
should allow protection for those aesthetic features that are merely
pleasing to the eye, while permitting the imitation of those aesthetic
features that contribute substantially to the usefulness of a product.
Aesthetic product features must be analyzed as to their purpose and
effect. If the feature is merely pleasing in appearance, and identifies
the source of the goods, the interests of both the public and the
trademark owner will be served by affording trademark protection to
these arbitrary and merely ornamental features. 277 By contrast, if the
feature is not just pleasing to the eye, but also contributes substantially
to the practical operation or efficiency of the product, either by means
of a specific aesthetic effect2 78 or apart from its aesthetics,279 then a
finding of functionality is warranted. In this instance, the granting of
exclusive rights in such an operationally utilitarian feature would give
the owner of those rights an unfair advantage over his competitors.
28 0
Application of this proposed standard requires a determination as to
whether the aesthetic product feature is merely pleasing to the eye and
thus non-functional. These purely decorative and ornamental features
might include an abstract color pattern on clothing or the tear drop
shape of jewelry. If the symbol or design's principal purpose is the
identification of goods, it should be afforded trademark protection.28 1
By contrast, an aesthetic feature should be found functional if it
contributes significantly to the utility of a product due to a particular
aesthetic effect it provides. 2 12 For example, a heart shaped necklace
should be found functional because the aesthetic effect resulting from
277. See supra pt. IV(A).
278. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 1981).
279. See J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir.
1941); cf. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d Cir. 1979)
(involving unfair competition claim), remand opinion rev'd on other grounds, 638
F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives
Labs., Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982).
280. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); J.C.
Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941).
281. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 7:6, at 62. Aesthetic product features may
also be protected under the law of unfair competition either at common law, cf.
International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (misappropriation
doctrine), or under § 43(a) of the federal Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
Section 43(a) provides a cause of action for the false designation of the origin of goods
and has been held applicable to a wide variety of unfair competition claims. 1 J.
Gilson, supra note 3, § 7.02, at 7-7, 7-19. A comprehensive discussion of these
potential areas of protection is beyond the scope of this Note.
282. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825-26 (3d Cir. 1981).
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the heart shape directly relates to its use as a gift for a loved one.283
Similarly, a Christmas tree design on holiday china should be found
functional because the aesthetic effect resulting from the depiction
directly relates to the product's seasonal use. Clearly, these features
should be accessible for all to incorporate into their products.
Accordingly, in Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries,2 84 in which the
shape of an outdoor wall-mounted luminaire was held functional, 285
the court should have initially analyzed the configuration to deter-
mine whether it was merely aesthetically pleasing or whether it pro-
vided a particular aesthetic effect significantly related to the use of the
product. Since the configuration was not merely pleasing to the eye,
but its particular aesthetic effect was its unique compatibility with
architecture, its effect directly contributed to the luminaire's use as an
outdoor lighting fixture on buildings2 86 and a finding of functionality
was warranted.
Aesthetic features may also be found functional if, apart from and
in addition to their aesthetic appeal, they contribute significantly to
the use, efficiency or economy of a product.2 8 7 For example, the
seemingly decorative shape of a chair may be functional because its
structural design contributes substantially to its comfort. Similarly, an
aesthetically pleasing shoe design may be functional because it in-
creases the shoe's arch support. In fact, J. C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee
Mercantile Co.,288 a decision integral to the formation of the modern
aesthetic functionality standard,2 89 involved this type of aesthetic fea-
ture: a 4-in-i overall pocket design with rounded corners. Although
the court correctly held the design functional,29 0 its finding should
have been based upon the following analysis. Because the rounded
pocket corners were not merely pleasing to the eye, but also decreased
the accumulation of dirt in the pockets more effectively than tradi-
tional square pockets,2 91 the design provided a sufficient utilitarian
value to the overalls to support a finding of functionality.
29 2
283. See Restatement of Torts § 742 comment a (1938).
284. 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981). See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
285. 653 F.2d at 826.
286. See id.
287. See J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir.
1941). Certain courts have, in fact, utilized this approach in holding certain aesthetic
features non-functional and thus capable of protection under unfair competition law.
See Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co., 512 F. Supp. 1184, 1189 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Le
Sportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 602, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
288. 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941). See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
289. Doctrine of Functionality, supra note 4, at 561-62; see Competitive Torts,
supra note 16, at 919-20.
290. 120 F.2d at 954.
291. Id.
292. See id.
1982]
386 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
A broad aesthetic functionality standard based solely on consumer
appeal has evolved as a divergent branch of the well-established,
utilitarian-oriented functionality doctrine. This broad approach,
however, disregards the very heart of the traditional functionality
doctrine-that only product features that contribute substantially to
the practical operational use of the product should be freely accessible
to the public. A more reasoned approach recognizes that an aesthetic
feature is functional if it provides a significant contribution to the
practical use of a product. Only in these instances does the granting of
protection pose a threat to free competition.
Deborah J. Krieger
